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BLD-238        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-1245 
___________ 
 
KAREEM ARMSTRONG, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
C.O. DIRAIMO 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-17-cv-00237) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Richard A. Lanzillo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 18, 2019 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE, and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 22, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________ 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Kareem Armstrong appeals the Magistrate Judge’s1 grant of summary judgment in 
his civil rights action.  We will summarily affirm. 
Armstrong’s case involves a random pat-down search while he was incarcerated at 
State Correctional Institution at Albion.  On October 8, 2016, Armstrong and another 
inmate, Tyrone Green, were returning to their housing unit after picking up medication 
when Correctional Officer Diraimo stopped them and ordered Armstrong over to the 
guard station for a random pat-down search.  Armstrong alleged that during this search 
Diraimo placed his hands inside Armstrong’s boxer shorts, stroked his penis once, and 
grabbed his scrotum.  When Armstrong objected, Diraimo allegedly stated, “I do what the 
fuck I want,” and “I felt bigger.”2  Armstrong subsequently filed a complaint pursuant to 
the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”), 34 U.S.C. § 30301, et seq., against Diraimo. 
On March 20, 2017, Armstrong was returning from the medication line when 
Diraimo again ordered him to submit to a random pat-down.  Armstrong informed 
Diraimo that Diraimo was not permitted to talk to him or touch him because of the 
pending PREA investigation.  Diraimo allegedly responded by stating, “You enjoy the 
way, I touch you and the way you stick your ass out got my dick hard.  Your PREA 
complaint don’t work and when, I caught you alone I’m gonna show you what a real dick 
                                              
1 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
636(c)(1). 
 
2 In his sworn declaration, Green stated that he heard Armstrong object, asking “why are 
you touching me there?” to which he “heard Diraimo state aggressively ‘I do the fuck 
what I want’ and ‘I felt bigger.’”  Dkt. #37 at 7.  
 
 3 
 
looks like.”  Dkt. #55 at 4.  Diraimo did not conduct a pat-down, and Armstrong was free 
to leave.  Diraimo did not touch Armstong at any point during their second encounter.   
Armstrong filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the First, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments for retaliation, sexual harassment, and 
discrimination, respectively.  Armstrong argued that Diraimo’s pat-down search on 
October 8, 2016, violated the Eighth Amendment and that Diraimo intentionally 
discriminated3 against him for that pat-down.  Armstrong further argued that the second 
encounter on March 20, 2017, was in retaliation for the PREA complaint.  After cross 
motions for summary judgment, the Magistrate Judge granted summary judgment in 
favor of Diraimo.  In granting summary judgment, the Magistrate Judge held that 
Armstrong failed to establish essential elements in his Eighth Amendment claim for 
sexual harassment.  As to Armstrong’s claim of discrimination in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Magistrate Judge held that 
Armstrong had failed to develop any evidentiary basis that would support his claim of 
discrimination, in addition to failing to show that he was a member of a protected class.  
Finally, the Magistrate Judge ruled that Armstrong’s claim of retaliation for the March 
20, 2017, encounter failed because Armstrong did not suffer any adverse action.  
Armstrong timely appealed. 
                                              
3 Armstrong asserted that Diraimo violated the Fourteenth Amendment “[b]ecause 
everyone who is similarly situated as me, being a prisoner, has to be treated all the same 
way.  So if he’s pat searching me inappropriately, but not pat searching anyone else 
inappropriately, then he’s just being discriminatory towards me.”  Dkt. #46-1 at 20. 
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We have jurisdiction over the appeal of the Magistrate Judge’s judgment.  See 
28 U.S.C. §§ 636(c)(3), 1291.  We review the summary judgment ruling de novo.  
Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011).  Summary judgment 
is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a); Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422–23 (3d Cir. 2006).  A party 
opposing summary judgment must cite to specific materials in the record that 
demonstrate the existence of a disputed issue of material fact.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)(1)(A).  Summary judgment must be granted against a party who fails to establish 
the existence of an essential element to that party’s case, if that party will bear the burden 
of proof at trial.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). 
Armstrong asserted that the random pat-down on October 8, 2016, violated his 
Eighth Amendment “right to be free from ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ while in 
custody.”  Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 2018).  In Ricks, we recognized 
that sexual abuse of an inmate by a corrections officer may violate the Eighth 
Amendment.  See id.  Like other Eighth Amendment claims, the framework for analyzing 
a sexual abuse claim consists of objective and subjective components.  Id. at 474–75. 
“That is, the incident must be objectively, sufficiently intolerable and cruel, capable of 
causing harm, and the official must have a culpable state of mind.”  Id. at 475.  A single 
incident, if sufficiently serious or severe, can violate the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 477.  
However, the standard is not “zero tolerance for all minor sexualized touching in prison, 
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such that all such claims are objectively serious to a constitutional degree.”  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
Upon review, we agree with the Magistrate Judge that Armstrong failed to provide 
evidence to support the existence of the subjective component mentioned above.4  
“Regarding the subjective prong, we consider whether the official had a legitimate 
penological purpose or if he or she acted ‘maliciously and sadistically for the very 
purpose of causing harm.’”  Id. at 475; see also Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 257–
58 (2d Cir. 2015) (“In determining whether an Eighth Amendment violation has 
occurred, the principal inquiry is whether the contact is incidental to legitimate official 
duties, such as a justifiable pat frisk or strip search, or by contrast whether it is 
undertaken to arouse or gratify the officer or humiliate the inmate.”).  Here, the alleged 
sexual abuse occurred during a random pat-down of Armstrong, and thus the alleged 
contact with Armstrong’s genitals was incidental to a legitimate penological purpose.  
See Crawford, 796 F.3d at 257–58; see also Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 
F.3d 1135, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (Smith, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(noting a “pat-down is done to detect contraband that may be taped to the contours of an 
inmate’s body, including the genital area”).  Furthermore, the evidence in the summary 
judgment record does not suggest that Diraimo was conducting the pat-down as a pretext 
                                              
4 Accordingly, we need not address whether the incident on October 8 satisfied the 
objective element. 
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to sexually arouse or gratify himself.5  Accordingly, we agree that summary judgment 
was appropriate.  See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23. 
As to Armstrong’s other claims of discrimination and retaliation, we conclude, for 
the reasons already thoroughly detailed by the Magistrate Judge, that summary judgment 
was appropriate.  The Magistrate Judge correctly held that Armstrong failed to establish 
he is a member of a suspect class; thus, his equal protection claim failed.  See Abdul-
Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (noting prisoners are not 
a suspect class for equal protection purposes).  To the extent Armstrong based his equal 
protection claim on a “class of one” theory, he failed to point to evidence in the summary 
judgment record that Diraimo treated him differently from his fellow inmates.  See PG 
Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 114–15 (3d Cir. 2013). 
Finally, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Armstrong’s retaliation 
claim failed because he did not point to evidence showing that he suffered any adverse 
action.  See Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (listing elements for a 
retaliation claim); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting an 
adverse action is one “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising 
                                              
5 Diraimo’s response to Armstrong’s objection to the search—that he “do[es] the fuck 
what [he] want[s]”—does not signify that the search was sexually motivated; rather, it 
was Diraimo’s unsophisticated justification for the search.  See Crawford, 796 F.3d at 
258 (noting prison officials looking for contraband may subject inmates to cavity 
searches that are of an “intensely personal nature”).  Diraimo’s subsequent statement that 
he had “felt bigger” is a juvenile taunt.  To be sure, Diraimo’s comments were 
inappropriate and unprofessional, but neither comment suggests a “culpable state of 
mind” indicating that the search was undertaken maliciously or for the purpose of 
sexually abusing Armstrong.  See id. at 256. 
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his First Amendment rights.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Moreover, the only 
retaliatory conduct alleged was a single verbal interaction with Diraimo approximately 
five months after the PREA complaint was filed.  See Watson, 834 F.3d at 424 (noting an 
inmate “can establish the third element of a prima facie case of retaliation with evidence 
of: (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the 
allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to 
establish a causal link” (emphasis added)). 
For all of the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
